



# MACsec & Automotive Security

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CAST Online Workshop Automotive Security


# Chapter 01.

What is MACsec?  
Why do you want it?


- MACsec
- MKA
- MACsec vs IPsec, TLS/DTLS, SecOC

# WHAT IS MACSEC?


- “Media Access Control (MAC) Security” is the standardized Security solution for the MAC layer by IEEE.
- “MAC security (MACsec) provides connectionless user data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity”, [1].
- MACsec is typically run in the “hop-by-hop” mode. This means that Ethernet frames are protected on wire but not inside an Ethernet Switch.
- MACsec requires Hardware support.
  
- Relevant Standards:
  - [1] “Media Access Control (MAC) Security”, IEEE Std 802.1AE, 2018.



# EXAMPLE PROTOCOL STACK.



# EXAMPLE PROTOCOL STACK.



Security

Standardized

In standardization

# HOW DOES MACSEC WORK?

## MACsec:

- “Authentication only” or “Encryption + Auth”.
- Hop-by-hop mode for link-based protection.
- Security Tag including Integrity Check Value (ICV).
- Based on Secure Association Key (SAK).
- Typically: GCM-AES-128 or GCM-AES-256.
- Optional: Extended Packet Number (XPN).

```

No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info
1 | 0.000000 | dc:a6:32:00:00:01 | ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff | ARP | 76 | Who has 169.254.95.161?

> Frame 1: 76 bytes on wire (608 bits), 76 bytes captured (608 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: dc:a6:32:00:00:01, Dst: ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
v 802.1AE Security tag
  > 0010 00.. = TCI: 0x08, VER: 0x0, SC
    .... ..00 = AN: 0x0
    Short length: 33
    Packet number: 119
    System Identifier: dc:a6:32:00:00:01
    Port Identifier: 1
    Ethertype: 0x0806
    Padding: 0000
    ICV: e4cfd6cbd028374e1594b390a64b8db7
> Address Resolution Protocol (ARP Probe)

0000 ff ff ff ff ff ff dc a6 32 00 00 01 88 e5 20 21 ..... 2..... !
0010 00 00 00 77 dc a6 32 00 00 01 00 01 08 06 00 01 ...w..2.....
0020 08 00 06 04 00 01 dc a6 32 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 ..... 2.....
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 a9 fe 5f a1 00 00 e4 cf d6 cb .....
0040 d0 28 37 4e 15 94 b3 90 a6 4b 8d b7 .....(7N...K..
  
```

But where to get the SAK from?

# MACSEC KEY AGREEMENT.


## MACsec Key Agreement (MKA):

- MKA allows to generate fresh SAKs for MACsec:
  - a) based on pre-shared Connectivity Association Key (CAK).
  - b) based on EAP generated CAK (e.g., based on EAP-TLS).
- Key Server is elected, and Key Server distributes encrypted SAK.

## MKA generates additional keys out of CAK:

- ICV Key (ICK): MKA message integrity protection.
- Key Encryption Key (KEK): encryption of keys in MKA messages.

**Recommendation: Use pre-shared CAKs for fastest startup.**



# MACSEC VS IPSEC, TLS, SECOC.

## MACsec can cover more communication:

- More protocols.
- Multicast + Broadcast too!

## MACsec is secure:

- MACsec, IPsec, TLS/DTLS can exchange fresh keys.
- SecOC typically does not have strong key exchange.

## MACsec is faster on startup (Key Exchange):

- MACsec one per Link
- IPsec one per ECU
- TLS/DTLS one per “application connection” \* “ECU using it”

→ **MACsec protects more, is secure, and faster.**







## Chapter 02.


# Is MACsec Ready for Automotive?

- Automotive MACsec.
- Challenge: Key Installation.
- Automotive MKA.
- Availability.

# AUTOMOTIVE MACSEC.

## Algorithm Choices:

- GCM-AES-128 or GCM-AES-256 depending on HW support.
- Typically, in “Authentication Only” for better testability.
- “Encryption + Authentication” requires more support:
  - Generate special CAKs for development vehicles.
  - Ensure that encrypted SAKs can be recorded by test equipment.



## Rekeying:

- Goal is one key exchange per power cycle.
- Extended Packet Number (XPN) allows that.

# CHALLENGE: KEY INSTALLATION.

## Challenge: Key installation (in plant and service):

- How to install keys for MACsec, if communication is not present yet?

## Option 1 – deactivate security for key installation.

- Simple solution but requires trust in service.
- OEM may not trust 3<sup>rd</sup> party service in all regions.

## Option 2 – bypassing MACsec.

- Current MACsec chips allow selected traffic to bypass MACsec (e.g., MKA).
- Best practice: create bypass for key installation, diagnostics, and update.
  - Securing the unprotected communication is critical (typically, DoIP).



# AUTOMOTIVE MKA.

Raspberry Pi: Regular MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) up to 8s (here 3s):

No.	Time	Time Delta	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	0.000000000	aa:ea:c4:e5:42:cc	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	98	Key Server
2	0.986986779	0.986986779	ce:e9:55:df:c2:5e	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	98	Key Server
3	2.001422945	1.014436166	aa:ea:c4:e5:42:cc	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	118	Key Server, Potential Peer List
4	2.988365546	0.986942601	ce:e9:55:df:c2:5e	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	150	Key Server, Live Peer List, Distributed SAK
5	2.995237588	0.006872042	ce:e9:55:df:c2:5e	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	194	Key Server, Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use, Distributed SAK
6	2.995736763	0.000499175	aa:ea:c4:e5:42:cc	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	162	Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use
7	2.996580117	0.000843354	aa:ea:c4:e5:42:cc	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	162	Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use

Raspberry Pi: Extensive tuning work <30ms but sometimes much longer:

No.	Time	Time Delta	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	0.000000000	52:54:00:5c:f9:b1	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	82	Key Server
2	0.006542060	0.006542060	52:54:00:aa:62:b6	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	82	
3	0.006907319	0.000365259	52:54:00:5c:f9:b1	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	102	Key Server, Potential Peer List
4	0.009524439	0.002617120	52:54:00:aa:62:b6	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	102	Potential Peer List
5	0.010436494	0.000912055	52:54:00:5c:f9:b1	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	134	Key Server, Live Peer List, Distributed SAK
6	0.011732499	0.001296005	52:54:00:5c:f9:b1	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	178	Key Server, Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use, Distributed SAK
7	0.017284492	0.005551993	52:54:00:aa:62:b6	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	146	Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use
8	0.023570478	0.006285986	52:54:00:aa:62:b6	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	146	Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use
9	0.025617745	0.002047267	52:54:00:aa:62:b6	01:80:c2:00:00:03	EAPOL-MKA	146	Live Peer List, MACsec SAK Use

See: Dr. Lars Völker, "Starting up MACsec for Automotive Ethernet", VDI Conference Cyber Security for Vehicles, Jun 2021.

Automotive Hardware: Technica Automotive MKA implementation:

Our Automotive demos takes from PHY linkup to MACsec ready:

- ~18ms including configuration of MACsec hardware.

# AVAILABILITY.

## Semiconductors:

- We have shown MACsec running on samples of two different vendors.
- Multiple vendors and chips for different speeds announced.

## Software:

- MACsec supported by Linux. You just need an “Automotive MKA” and a driver.
- We have created Automotive MKA code.
- AUTOSAR is working on MACsec integration for AUTOSAR Classic.

## Tools:

- We are working on Tools, Test Suites, etc.

**Estimation: First SOPs in 2024 – 2026 probable.**

## **Chapter 03.**

### **Does MACsec solve all problems?**

- MACsec vs End-to-End Security.
- Complementary solutions.

# MACSEC VS. END-TO-END SECURITY.

## Unprotected in Ethernet Switches?

- Inside the Ethernet Switch communication is unprotected.
- As before: Secure configuration of Ethernet Switches is a must!
- Attacking the Switch itself seems unfeasible since all silicon.



## No “End-to-End Security” with MACsec?

- “But MACsec cannot protect until the application”.
  - IPsec, TLS, SecOC do not either, if you examine implementations!
- “But MACsec does not protect the “host identity””.
  - MACsec need to combined with complementary solutions!


# COMPLEMENTARY SOLUTIONS (1).

## Address Filtering on Switches !

- Since switch ports are authenticated, strong address and VLAN filtering (layer 2 and 3) is possible and highly recommended.
  - This stops address spoofing and unauthorized VLAN access.
- **Similar security as with IPsec and TLS/DTLS is achieved.**

## In addition, Security on Ethernet Switches is greatly improved:

- Ports are blocked until MKA authentication successful.
- Ports only accept protected traffic.
- Port filters can be more specific (think ECU options).






# COMPLEMENTARY SOLUTIONS (2).

## Packet Filters and ACLs:

- Without spoofing many solution get easier.
- Packet filters can trust that a source IP is not modified.
  - Stronger filtering on ECUs possible.
  - With multiple IPs (e.g., virtualization), ECUs need to also filter outgoing.
- Simple ACLs can now achieve high Security for SOME/IP.
  - No need for “costly” application protocol specific security.
  - Updating and managing ACL policy needs to be solved.



**Don't forget: Use VLANs for segmentation!**

# SUMMARY.

## Maximum Protection:

- MACsec allows protection of basically all Ethernet frames.

## Ready:

- MACsec and MKA can be made "Automotive".
- Chips, Software, Tools, and Testing are worked on.

Thank you for your attention!



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